Terence Corrigan
With today's media platforms, it's possible to have a front-row seat, even a sense of participation, at distant events.
This is probably especially true for outsiders looking at the United States, and never more so than when it is undergoing an election. South Africans following the recent election campaign would have noted the intensity of rhetoric.
Each side warned of the dire consequences of the other's ascent to office and the authoritarian impulses this would unleash.
Particularly stark were the words of Oprah Winfrey at Vice-President Harris' final election rally:
It is entirely possible that we will not have the opportunity to ever cast a ballot again.
Oprah is, for many in both South Africa and the US, a beloved figure. And while she may skilfully preside over uplifting talk shows and promotional interviews, her political acumen is out of touch with contemporary realities.
The US is in no plausible danger of a regime that abolishes elections, presided over by a president-for-life. Indeed, outside a few long-term, formal autocracies – China, Cuba, North Korea, for example – this is not how today's authoritarianism operates.
The past two decades dashed hopes that the post-Cold War world would embrace multi-party democracy as a universal ideal. Many of those societies that attempted that leap have relapsed in one way or another, or have become in some way stuck in their transition.
This was in fact recognised in the 1990s, when Fareed Zakaria pointed out that while electoral democracy was apparently thriving, the supporting institutions that characterised mature democracies – courts, free media and so on – were not. He described this as "illiberal democracy".
In essence, this meant that while the opportunity to elect a new government might exist, government accountability and free political competition are to some degree restricted. But even for the more egregious offenders, elections were necessary to claim the legitimacy that comes from subjecting a government's tenure to the judgement of "the people".
Since the 1990s, the risks have multiplied. At that time, democracy held an unchallenged promise and mystique. Not anymore. The democratic wave of that time was not always accompanied by the economic upliftment many had hoped for. And authoritarian leaders quickly adapted to the new environment.
As Authoritarianism Goes Global, a 2016 collection of essays on the subject, explains, countries like Russia, China and Iran have not only kept internal challenges at bay, but have been able to export their models as legitimate, culturally appropriate models for emulation elsewhere.
This is often couched in terms of authoritarian development: a society needs prosperity and security, while political liberty may (or may not) come later. This offers a discourse to justify repression, with an obvious attraction to elites seeking to continue their hold on office (and its spoils), and to populations desperate for rudiments of a functional society. It may even be able to deliver elements of success in its developmental endeavours. China certainly has.
New despotism
John Keane, an Australian political scholar, coined the term "the new despotism".
"Today's despotism," he writes, "is a new type of pseudo-democratic government led by rulers skilled in the arts of manipulating and meddling with people's lives, marshalling their support, and winning their conformity. Despotisms craft top-to-bottom relations of dependency oiled by wealth, money, law, elections, and much media talk of defending 'the people' and 'the nation' against 'domestic subversives' and 'foreign enemies'."
He warns further:
Those who think the word 'despotism' is a synonym for repression and raw force are mistaken. In practice, the rulers of the new despotisms are masters of deception and seduction.
The face of authoritarianism today is not one that cancels elections but captures them. The outcome has been the endurance of party-states (in practice if not in name), oligarchic arrangements and suborned institutions in which power is used to effect skewed outcomes or traded as a commodity. Versions of this are well in evidence in southern Africa, most recently in Mozambique.
South Africans vicariously living this moment in US politics should remember that their own country is well advanced down this road. Its corruption malaise and governance failings did not arise spontaneously, but are intimately linked to choices consciously taken in the 1990s, most notably the decision to structure a civil service around political loyalty and racial representivity – and the ANC's counter-constitutional programme of "cadre deployment", the original state capture. Some have profited mightily off this, politically and financially. South African democracy is poorer for it.
Note too that authoritarianism is no longer inevitably fronted by a scowling ideologue. Many of today's "new despots" are highly educated, articulate and evoke genuine affection; they may be assisted by those with fine intentions. In South Africa, the corruption of its constitutional order started in the 1990s, under Nelson Mandela. It continued under the sometime technocracy of Thabo Mbeki.
For all Jacob Zuma's sins, he was a wildly popular figure and merely accelerated a wave of institutional corruption that had long existed. President Ramaphosa came to power promising a "new dawn" – after having served as head of the cadre deployment committee during the height of Zuma-era state capture. He refuses to disavow the practice (and the records of the committee during his tenure are strangely unavailable).
As Keane remarked in specific reference to South Africa, the country demonstrates "that among the most unsettling features of the new despotism is the way its spirit, language, and institutional dynamics are taking root within the democratic world".
Concerns about the political health of the American Republic need not dwell on whether a presidential election will be held in 2028. It will. The question is under what conditions and with what integrity it will take place. Strikingly, both parties could point with justification at the other for abuses of the country's institutions: circumventing constraints on power, the weaponisation of non-partisan institutions, and court packing. And it is perhaps a heightened danger where – as in the US – numerous administrative and judicial officers are chosen by election.
South Africa too will hold an election in 2029. By past experience, there is little to fear about its conduct. But the constitutional arrangements that surround it have been abused and suborned – indeed, space for political influence is built into many of them – and few interest groups seem keen on addressing this. What is a concern for American democracy has been pursued as a party programme for decades in South Africa. This may be of greater importance to South Africa's future than events that they watch from afar.
Terence Corrigan is project and publications manager at the IRR.