

**16<sup>th</sup> Alfred and Winifred Hoernlé Memorial Lecture**

# **Can Africa come of age?**

The  
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**C. W. de Kiewiet**

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The Sixteenth Hoernlé Memorial Lecture

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AGE ?**

*Delivered under the auspices of the  
South African Institute of Race Relations*

*by*

**Prof. C. W. de Kiewiet**

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# The Hoernlé Memorial Lecture

A LECTURE entitled the Hoernlé Memorial Lecture (in memory of the late Professor R. F. Alfred Hoernlé, President of the South African Institute of Race Relations from 1934 to 1943), is delivered once a year under the auspices of the Institute. An invitation to deliver the lecture is extended each year to some person having special knowledge and experience of racial problems in Africa and elsewhere.

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## CAN AFRICA COME OF AGE ?

I WAS Professor Hoernlé's first South African graduate student. That was thirty-seven years ago. The Transvaal University College had one real building. Naturally this was occupied by the administration and the sciences. The humanities worked in the shabby pre-Boer War corrugated iron shack which we called the Tin Temple. In those days the professors had to be the college. There was nothing else. Books were too few to be called a library.

A first generation always seems to have more giants than later generations. Two men, Hoernlé in philosophy and Macmillan in history, were as fine teachers as I ever again experienced. They taught me the lesson that the greatest gift a university can give to a student is to place him at the feet of a powerful mind.

Hoernlé was not proud of his first graduate student. He was frank but kind in making that plain. My justification for addressing you is not based upon any standing in philosophy. Nor can I claim a detailed expertness in African politics and economics, which were Hoernlé's other fields of concern. My justification must depend on perspective and a great interest. To see Africa from the perspective which America makes possible can be valuable. Also valuable can be the effort to see Africa in the context of the whole world. Fortunately the oppressive responsibilities of a university president have not succeeded in quenching my ardent and lively interest in everything that concerns Africa.

Just about everybody is happily generalising about Africa—its wealth, its poverty, its ignorance, its injustices, its sure promise for the future, its incorrigible backwardness. You can take your choice.

One should be careful in offering advice on how to regard Africa to an audience that is sophisticated and that lives in Africa. But I remember two sayings, one by Lord Salisbury and the other by André Gide. "If you want to be misinformed about a country," said Salisbury, "talk to a man who has lived there for thirty years, and speaks the language." And André Gide patiently explained that "Everything has been said already, but as no one listens, we must always begin again."

In trying to understand today's complex and turbulent Africa, a word of caution must be spoken against easy optimism, against

harsh scepticism, and against facile analogies. Optimism, scepticism and analogies are useful, as I trust they will be useful in this presentation, provided that we recognise two facts. A genuine revolution is under way in Africa, and no man has ever definitively analysed a revolution while it was taking place. It is only today that we can begin to speak with confidence about the true nature of the Russian revolution.

We should be on our guard against the emotional persuasion that political independence is so right a condition that its establishment will have all the right consequences. To this persuasion the American man in the street is especially subject. From his own history he draws the conclusion that political independence is a guarantee of growing strength and increasing prosperity. Since he believes that what is good for America is good for the world, he has no difficulty in solving the problems of other countries.

Just as much should we be on our guard against a purely cynical or sceptical forecast for the new African states. There is a long catalogue of ignorance, backwardness, tribalism, regionalism, prejudice and poverty that can legitimately be drawn. Those who have lived most intimately with the African are perhaps the most likely to shrug their scornful shoulders at the thought that out of such a catalogue can come respectable modern societies.

The attitude, I suggest, for the thoughtful man to take must be one of sympathy and a deep interest. This should be accompanied by continuous effort at critical assessment and understanding. I would add a sense of wonder at the endless variety of man's history, and end with an acceptance for my part of a moral obligation to co-operate with the forces now struggling to express themselves, so that they may have a favorable destiny.

In what mood is Africa entering this period of its history? Societies that have broken away from the dominion or constraint of Nineteenth Century imperialism are almost uniformly possessed by a deep urge to vindicate and justify their independence by some signal posture, ambition or achievement. They are unconsummated or unsaturated societies. They differ greatly in their attitude towards the western world which was the focus of colonial and imperial power. The extremes are marked by China and by India. Communist China is an unconsummated and unsaturated power obsessed by a great sense of resentment against the western world. China may therefore be driven to find

satisfaction for past indignity and deprivation by a sort of counter-imperialism through military conquest and territorial expansion. This makes China a far greater source of unsettlement in the modern world than even Russia.

Stalingrad and Sputnik have profoundly changed the posture of Russia. Stalingrad was a bloody purge of past frustration and defeat. Sputnik gave Russia rank in science and technology. It may well be that the greatest contribution which Hitler made to human welfare was to force Russia into a great war which she conclusively won. Mr. Khrushchev reveals a Russia somewhat like the America between the first and second World Wars, successful, confident, bumptious, garrulous, but increasingly anxious to assure her prosperity and wealth.

The manner and the spirit in which independent India entered modern history in 1947 are a great tribute to British statesmanship and also to the British universities. From British professors many of India's leaders acquired a deep understanding of ideas of democratic governance, of the rule of law and of tolerance. As long as India can continue the effort to build its future upon political and legal institutions developed under British rule, we shall be in the presence of one of the most reassuring factors in the modern world. This alone is reason enough for the United States and the rest of the western world to give India generous support in developing its political and economic future.

India is showing a way which Africa may hopefully follow. She has a special authority amongst colored and colonial peoples. That she does not have a flaming desire for retroactive revenge provides the agitated world of Africa with an example and a warning against the voices of Khrushchev, Mao Tse Tung and Nasser. When Nkrumah visited Nehru about eighteen months ago he presented himself as a fellow-crusader against the iniquities of colonialism. Nehru's moderate reply could only have reminded Nkrumah that wise and constructive relationships with the western world must be based on more than a sense of grievance.

Africa is entering modern history with powerful forces in her favor. Ideas of nationalism and self-rule are even more compelling than they were in the last quarter of the Nineteenth Century. There was a brief moment between Yalta and San Francisco when it seemed likely that international relations would be dominated by the few great powers, and that the lesser nations of the world would be firmly polarised around either the United States or the Soviet Union. The stalemate of the Cold War has

caused the influence of the lesser powers to increase. Outside the Iron Curtain even the smallest and newest nations are active and vocal. They are courted by the greater states. Thus, leaders of the new and inexperienced African states can insist successfully on an equality of prestige and expression with more ancient colleagues. Africa, in any event, has more of the world's sympathy than any other continent. It is the one continent about which most western nations have a bad conscience.

The aspirations of Africa have powerful allies in popular emotion. Both American and British public opinion are determined not to appear in a bad light in Africa. In both countries the intellectual leadership even insists that Africa must move decisively forward. About Africa there is a sense of urgency, and the conviction that this is Africa's day. Neither the United States nor Great Britain can take any position that reduces the political role of Africa. There will be no opposition to the rise of African political aspirations. To this fact the white populations of Kenya, the Congo, the Rhodesias and South Africa must reconcile themselves.

In the United States the names of African leaders like Nkrumah, Azikiwe, Touré, Mboya, Nyerere are better known than the names of white leaders like Welensky of Northern Rhodesia or Blundell of Kenya. This is partly the result of the sympathy with which they are received. But it is also the result of their striking success in drawing attention to themselves and to the causes which they represent. When the head of an African state or of an important political movement comes to Great Britain, France, Russia, India or the United States, he is received with the same dignity and ceremony traditionally accorded to the heads of more ancient states. Nkrumah was the personal guest of Queen Elizabeth. Touré was met in Washington by the Vice-President and enjoyed a military guard and police escort to the White House.

The travels of Mr. Khrushchev and President Eisenhower are a new international competition for the favorable attention of the world. In this competition men like Nyerere, Touré, Nkrumah are far ahead of their white African rivals. It is said that Mr. Touré made a greater impression on the United Nations than Mr. Khrushchev. Their success has made the unfavorable international picture of Dr. Verwoerd, for example, more unfavorable still. This is obviously a factor of very great meaning for South Africa's international relations. To the extent that public opinion



outside Africa influences the course of events inside Africa, the international prominence of the African leaders has won a great advantage.

In the main the African leaders handle themselves well. Nyerere's American audiences were impressed by his temperate statements. Most of them surprise their audiences by their understanding of problems and issues outside their own territories.

The requirements and expectations of the new African leadership are many. Foremost are dignity for themselves and respect for their movements. They have the state of mind of young men who do not want the love of their parents but their respect, for that is the acceptance of their manhood. Such demands are made powerful by a sense of earlier indignity and deprivation. At this stage in the emergence of African states political opportunity, diplomatic recognition, and the appropriate symbols of status and equality are even more important than economic and financial factors. It is useless and provocative to argue that this puts the cart before the horse.

In an earlier and more leisurely generation economic development, financial strength and social integrity preceded constitutional advancement. In Africa today it is quite certain that the normal requirements of economics, of investment and fiscal balance will not exert their Nineteenth Century influence in tempering the pace of political change. The most powerful ideas are political ideas. They are more easily grasped than the principles of industry or banking. African leaders want their political inferiority cured even more than malnutrition or disease.

It is instructive to observe the new African leaders in their travels abroad. In the United States and Great Britain, President Sekou Touré of Guinea was first of all concerned with establishing what he called *la personnalite africaine*. Nineteenth Century royalty hardly insisted more on a protocol that did justice to the head of his new state.

Inside Africa an important barrier has been crossed. A new category of political leaders has been opened. These men watch one another. They learn from one another. Between them there is both competition and emulation. They stimulate the rise of others like them. A turning point clearly was reached when African political events lost their strictly local character, when the words and acts of Nkrumah, Azikiwe, Nyerere, Banda, Mboya, Touré and others became known to each other, so that their influence and promptings passed from one area to another. One

result was the acceleration of change. The time schedule of even ten years ago no longer makes sense. Africa has entered a period which will certainly see the rise of more leaders and an increase in their ability to organise bodies of followers. South Africans can only follow with acute interest the effect upon their own African population of the great rise in stature and effectiveness of African leadership beyond their borders. The loneliness and obscurity of struggling political leaders are gone. The shadow of gaol no longer hovers over them. They receive stimulation and justification from events in Algeria, from the pronouncements of Nasser, the taunts of Khrushchev, the challenges of Mao Tse Tung, the mouthings of Menon, and the votes of Asian and African delegates in the United Nations. They are a part of movements greater than those which they themselves lead. Because of this they are less lonely and less timid. They are positively encouraged to boldness. We cannot exclude the possibilities of dangerous and unreflective rashness or maybe even great arrogance and bloody-mindedness. They are no longer frightened men. They are on the offensive. Africa's European populations are on the defensive.

African leaders are easier to describe than the people and forces behind them. Through an excess of sympathy or emotional enthusiasm men have too greatly simplified or distorted the meaning of African political developments. The first word to use in describing these developments is not democracy, but nationalism. This is an essential distinction. The massive confrontation in the world between free democracy and communism disposes us to an unwarranted belief that these are the only choices open to the societies of the world, both old and new. In the same manner that this is a world of many nations, so is this a world of many political forms. What political pattern will develop in any African state will depend on elements drawn from its own native culture and from others drawn from the outside world.

There are not two but three ideologies in the modern world. The third is nationalism. Unless we recognise that the nationalistic drive for self-rule and economic development is a primary force, we shall make the mistake of not understanding that nationalism comes first. Only in the course of time and under the pressure of events will the new nation develop its own relationship with the other two ideologies of democracy and communism.

What African leaders ask of the outside world is help in establishing their nationalism. Nationalism is not yet the expres-

sion of an inner unity, but rather the mobilisation of many different groups in an effort to establish nationhood. The distinction which I am making is obscured by the fact that the emerging states in Africa have adopted, or plan to adopt, parliamentary forms of government. At the moment African nationalism also is equated geographically with the boundaries arbitrarily established by the colonising powers. It is impossible to predict how stable these political and territorial equations are likely to be. African nationalism is, therefore, an imprecise and unstable concept. It is realistic to anticipate a season of instability and dissension while the pattern of nations is being established. South Africans must reconcile themselves to existence in a restless and turbulent Africa. What these new states do with their independence will greatly shape the world in which we live.

Within states and between states there is a babel of ideas about integration and divisiveness, federation and separation, consolidation and regionalism. Ghana has already offered itself as the nucleus of an expansive West African Federation. In French West Africa, Dahomey, Haute Volta, Senegal, and Soudan have formed the Federation of Mali. They have declared themselves willing to receive other states. A loose customs union without intimate political consequences has been formed between Chad, Congo, Gabon and the Central African Republic. There is even talk of a pan-African movement to marshal Black Africa against the white man.

Ideas of integration and consolidation are sympathetically received outside Africa. Balkanisation is no more popular in Russia than it is in the democratic West. Communist opinion is delighted at the prospect of all free Black Africa uniting to sweep away the wreckage of Colonial imperialism. Because of the classic union of the Thirteen Colonies, American sympathy also is easily won for union or federation. From a purely economic point of view the ideal would be the establishment of the largest possible units with a diversity of agricultural and mineral resources, and bound together by an efficient system of communications to overcome the handicaps of desert, rain and bush. The political and economic systems from which we draw our beliefs are our own. They are forms of political association which have depended for their success upon certain conditions. Many of these conditions are lacking in Africa.

In Great Britain, the United States, and France the first of these conditions was the cultural homogeneity of the nation. In

these democracies differences of religion, race and social condition were not able to defeat the co-operation upon which democratic government depends. This homogeneity has always been greatest in the United Kingdom. Of this Alexis de Tocqueville gave superb testimony in 1857:

“It is the greatest spectacle there is in the world; though not everything there is great. Above all one can see things there which are entirely unknown in the rest of Europe and the sight of which has comforted me.

“I see no reason to doubt that there exists among the lower classes a certain number of sentiments hostile to the other classes; but one does not perceive them. What one does see on all sides is union and agreement among all those who form part of the educated classes from the humblest tradesman to the highest ranks of the aristocracy—agreement to defend society, and to conduct its affairs together and in freedom. I do not envy England her riches and her power, but I envied her this. And I breathed more freely on finding myself, after so many years, away from those hatreds and jealousies between the classes which after having been the source of our woes have now deprived us of our liberty.”

The outstanding achievement of American history has been the creation in only a few generations of a stable, culturally homogeneous society out of the great variety of ethnic groups which migrated to the New World. The present issue of negro segregation in the United States is acute precisely because all other racial, religious and cultural groups have been substantially integrated into American society. For a number of reasons the negro came last in the creation of a culturally homogeneous America.

A number of new nations in Asia and Africa with formally democratic institutions have thus far failed to establish an assured cultural homogeneity. In these societies, differences of religion, race and language have not been reduced or subordinated to a point where they are not a menace to the successful operation of democratic institutions. In Malaya the Chinese and Malay populations have not resolved their acute racial and social differences. Until they do, democracy in Malaya is an experiment and not an assured fact. In India, differences of language, race, creed and caste remain major hazards for Nehru's remarkable achievement. Israel refuses to permit the return of the Arab refugees largely because it feels that it cannot maintain a democracy of Jews and

Arabs. This is what the French colons and the Algerian nationalists feel about each other, the Irish of Northern Ireland and Eire, and clearly South Africans about their own Native population. *Apartheid* is a South African word, but not a South African monopoly.

We have raised the question whether the new African states will have or can soon achieve a sufficient degree of cultural homogeneity to give stability and prosperity to their institutions. What promise is there of equality or uniformity or integration or fraternity that would permit democratic nations to flourish in spite of race, class, tribe, or creed. Dr. Nkrumah seems to believe that a pan-African fraternity is possible. Fraternity is an English word without a real English meaning. In France it describes that condition of national closeness that cannot be broken by the most violent disagreements.

Against the hopes and goals that use the language of consolidation, integration and pan-Africanism, there is an impressive list of influences that make for separation, suspicion and contention. Ancient resentments and new ambitions, clashes of race and tribe and region, the rivalry of leaders, ambitious economic demands and social dislocation are all forces that will try the strength of young institutions. The seeds of irredentism are sown in illogical frontiers, and in the arbitrary separation of related tribal and linguistic groups.

Africa has all of the problems and more that have caused political institutions in Pakistan, Burma and Indonesia to falter or become distorted. The British Southern and Northern Cameroons are split on whether to join with Nigeria or the French Cameroons or maintain an uneasy *status quo*. There has been civil war in the French Cameroons. In the French territories Mohammedanism is a strong dividing force. In Uganda stubborn tribalism stands in the way of political agreement. Some Uganda political leaders have begun to look to Cairo for guidance which could draw Uganda out of the orbit of Kenya and Tanganyika. No sooner was it plain that the Belgian Congo would have independence than violent differences broke out on the unitary or federal character of the still unborn state. In the Sudan, parliamentary democracy has actually collapsed under the pressure of unresolved rivalries and contradictions between pro-Cairo and pro-Western elements, between Mohammedans and Africans. We can move from territory to territory and read the same story of tension and disagreement. Northern Nigeria is passing through

an especially difficult period of confusion and acrimony because of the collisions between three systems of law—the English, the customary and the Islamic. The technical and procedural conflicts are made dangerous by the discrimination shown by Islamic law against the non-Mohammedan minority, which exists in a status of inferiority under the law. This catalogue could be longer and range more widely. There has, it is true, been almost no serious violence used in the achievement of political self-rule. In that sense there is no revolution in Africa—only reform. The new states will quarrel. Will they fight and even make war?

They all want a university. Those on the coast all want a dry dock. They all want a bunch of ambassadors, and they all want arms. Amongst the very first consignments to arrive in French Guinea after independence was a shipment of Czechoslovakian war material. The era of African disarmament is over. Arms will move openly or stealthily, legally or illegally across frontiers. The Nineteenth Century embargo on arms cannot be maintained. Informed opinion in the western world is deeply concerned. It would prefer to see a tacit demilitarisation of the African states. Should the new communities be given arms if the consequence is a domestic or inter-state power struggle? Will armament encourage a fragmentation of territories, or militaristic ventures of conquest and consolidation? What effect could armaments have on remaining French, British, Belgian and Portuguese interests? How serious will the free flow of guns and ammunition be for the relationship between South Africa and its Native population? This could be very serious.

The conclusion is easy to reach that the West should be reluctant to give military aid. The free flow of arms in the Caribbean and Central America has been notoriously unsettling for generations. But this reluctance opens the way for Russian activity. Russian military aid means Russian influence, economic agreements and economic manipulation. The Nineteenth Century embargo on arms is certain to break down.

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THE question which transcends all others is whether the new states will be economically viable and inspire fiscal confidence. Very close behind the search of African leaders for international dignity is the search for economic aid. Anybody who undertakes to discuss the economic and financial problems of Africa will be wise to step carefully. He must avoid the facile popular belief that Africa is potentially so rich in resources that development is merely a matter of investment and enterprise. On the other hand, the application of modern science and technology will probably go very far in overcoming some of the hitherto intractable aspects of African development. The manner in which Canadians and Russians are overcoming the forbidding Arctic terrain is full of suggestions for the future of Africa. The airplane, desalination of sea water, modern medicine, nuclear reactors can perform miracles to overcome Africa's great handicap.

The new African leaders are panting to catch up with history. Like their Asian colleagues, they are men in a hurry, anxious to have the machines and amenities upon which Russians, Americans, Chinese, Englishmen and Germans set such great store.

There is a traditional order of reasoning which assumes that the African states must expect to move patiently through the stages which marked the development of other societies with a colonial origin. Canada, Australia and South Africa would be good examples. Here is one of the analogies against which we must be on our guard. It is an anachronism to think of the ox wagon or the lonely log hut as the tools and symbols of modern pioneering. The political pretension of most, if not all African territories, lack an adequate economic base. But African leaders reject the argument that politics must slow down for economics to catch up. Instead they insist that economics must speed up to overtake the headlong pace of politics.

A combination of need, haste, ambition and inexperience is likely to make new governments in Africa far more peremptory and radical than their predecessors in the Nineteenth Century. A look first at the development of the Brazilian interior and then of Israel indicates that opening up the wilderness does not follow the pattern of ox wagons, muddy tracks, isolation and slow penurious years of accumulation of capital. In the modern world pioneers take with them the equipment of the modern world. The first tool used to open up the wilderness for the building of

the new capital of Brazilia was not a woodsman's axe. It was an airplane. Then came hard surfaced roads, architects and engineers. The population that will go to Brazilia will expect and will find modern plumbing, hotels, clinics, movie houses—bioscopes to you. A better illustration may be found in modern Israel, which is so much like parts of Africa. In the arid Neger desert the school, the clinic, the electric light plant and irrigation all preceded the settler. Of itself Israel has inadequate resources for such expensive undertakings. But Israel insists that the only way for its economics to catch up with its politics is to put it under forced draft.

These analogies have their faults. Other available ones from India or China have different faults. But in all cases there is a common conclusion. The leadership of new or under-developed countries aims high and will try to climb fast. A late Nineteenth Century economist would find altogether exaggerated the trade unionism, the costly social services and the civic amenities which the fledgling states of today's world demand. Pioneering countries like Israel which rigid economic analysis must describe as fiscally insecure should not have a costly regime of social services. But the luxuries of yesterday have become the necessities of today. Of them Africa will want its share.

Before we speak, as we must, of Africa's great handicaps in poverty, ignorance, lack of skills and under-equipment, we must look at the help which the outside world may give to Africa. One of the consequences of the Cold War is a global struggle for the allegiance and sympathy of people. In the eyes of the west, and especially the United States, sound economic, political and social institutions are the ramparts of free peoples against communism. These ramparts have such value that some of their cost could properly be borne as part of the burden of national defense. The debate has already opened on the aid that the United States may be willing to give to the more rapid development of new African states. The African states have a certain bargaining power. In part this is due to the promises of assistance from Russia. We are still trying to interpret the new Russia which Mr. Khrushchev leads. The evidence is growing that Russia is less interested in exploiting economic collapse and political chaos. Because of her own industrial power Russia too has begun to look upon undeveloped areas as markets for its economic production. Propaganda through trade rather than blatant ideological subversion is likely to be the new Russian approach. But Russia has an appeal



to all undeveloped societies that does not at all depend on propaganda.

Western analysis has concerned itself with the brutal and dictatorial qualities of communism. Intellectuals have labored to expose its philosophic errors and contradictions. What was overlooked was the hard fact that the Soviet Union has developed a powerful method of giving coherence, drive and discipline to an economically backward or un-coordinated society. It has devised instruments of coercion and control that give governmental stability, social discipline and resolute economic direction. Africa needs these. Mr. Khrushchev's boast that Russia possesses a superior instrument of modernisation cannot be lightly dismissed. Russia appears as a most significant alternative method of government and economic action, one possibly better adapted to backward nations than those of the west.

We are exposed to far greater uncertainties in Africa than many of us realise. Without rooted and tested habits of freedom, or the accumulation of diverse skills, without the capital wealth required by modern industry or the free flow of income to maintain social services, we must surely expect unusual means to correct these deficiencies. In its search for success in acquiring the symbols and real attributes of modern society, the African state may follow a fluctuating and empirical pattern in its dealings with the communist and western blocs that is certain to be exasperating and sometimes disillusioning. Ghana's guided democracy and the enactment of laws that would be unacceptable in the United Kingdom or the United States may appear as the early perversion of Parliamentary government and the rule of law. But in the wide context of the new Africa they illustrate the expedients that governments feel they must adopt to give coherence, discipline, direction to their people and force to their enterprise. This is why we cannot ignore the lessons that may be deduced from Russian or Chinese experience. This is why western societies cannot in their own interest relinquish the effort to develop Africa.

Here is the great problem and challenge for the West. We have to make possible a clear sense of purpose. We need to be flexible in recognising that methods adapted to African conditions must be employed to advance the pace of modernisation, even though they may be somewhat alien to our own practice. This will be a severe test of our liberalism and our discernment.

To the extent that we must provide an attractive alternative to the aggressive radicalism of Russian foreign policy we have, I greatly fear, reason to be concerned about the weak and unconvincing image projected by liberalism in almost all of the western world. The existence in some society of commanding and historic importance, such as Great Britain or the United States, of a successful and impressive non-Marxist liberalism could be of the greatest value in generating an atmosphere of understanding and sympathy towards peoples engaged in a difficult struggle towards a new destiny. In America liberalism of the sort which I have in mind is politically ambiguous and economically contradictory. The fine salt of socialism in Great Britain has lost some of its savor. In France the great radical streams of the Nineteenth Century have separated into trickles almost without historic force.

The weakness of the non-Marxist has this consequence. It increases the saliency and magnifies the appeal of the ambitious Marxist drive. It is upon less flexible and more conservative political and economic elements that the burden at present rests of dealing with societies with which political and economic sympathy may not always be easy. We may therefore do too little and do it too late.

Some members of this audience may have begun to wonder whether they are in the presence of yet another visitor from abroad who has not thought of the white communities of Kenya, the Congo, the Rhodesias and the Union of South Africa. To these communities the matters whereof I have spoken are of the gravest importance. To say that they are matters of life and death is no longer too grim a use of words. Yet there is need to convey to the outside world what the great changes in Africa mean, and how they feel to white men and women to whom Africa too is a native soil.

The rapid growth of African nationalism has operated like General MacArthur's Pacific campaign. Nationalism is leap-frogging across and isolating the white communities of Africa. It is advancing southwards towards the very borders of the greatest concentration of white population in Southern Rhodesia and the Union of South Africa. If it was ever possible to form a league or bloc of the white communities of Kenya, the Congo, the Rhodesias and South Africa, this is now entirely out of the question. The rise of political demands in the Belgian Congo, and the dramatic concessions which have been made to them, are by far the most important developments of the past few years.

The imminence of self-government for the Congo destroys entirely the illusion that the Belgians or anybody else had the secret of a slow, orderly evolution towards political maturity. The collapse of the special form of Belgian liberal paternalism makes it utterly plain that this is such a spring tide of political change as one may compare with the unbiddable rise of waters in the Bay of Fundy.

In Tanganyika the elections next September will be conducted on a common voters' roll. The special devices weighted in favor of minority racial groups cannot alter the fact that white men will be ruled by black men. An entirely new frontier has been crossed. The combination of events in Tanganyika and the Congo has shattered any prospects, if they existed at all, of a common stand by Africa's white communities. Kenya now is flanked by Uganda, Tanganyika and the Congo, and cannot ignore the patterns set in these territories. There is no chance that Downing Street—what an old-fashioned phrase this has become!—can yield ultimate power to white leadership. Nor can it be violently seized. The white settlers of Kenya will soon have to swallow a bitter pill. The monopoly of the white highlands can surely be no longer maintained, and government will have to be shared with the African population.

What began in Ghana is moving in every direction. The combined mass of West Africa, Central Africa and East Africa is being added to the preponderant balance against the South. We are witnessing the rapid shrinkage of the area in which Europeans hold political control. The way is opening for the transmission towards the Zambesi of the pace and the character of political change. The impact upon the Central African Federation is already apparent.

In Nyasaland, Northern and Southern Rhodesia a time of decision is approaching. The hope that the Central African Federation would be the first successful experiment in multi-racial political co-operation is much less bright than it once was. The crisis is severe. The Monckton Commission, whatever the wording of its terms of reference, raises the issue of the existence of the Federation. There will be a period of efforts to maintain the *status quo* through experiments with alternatives and compromises. But it seems inescapable that any continuance of the Federation can be assured only by concessions to African political demands. Alternatives are becoming fewer, and the compromises more difficult. As the racial gulf widens the range of political choice becomes narrower. In Kenya both parties with multi-racial

co-operation as their principal platform have lost ground, i.e., Kenya National Party under African leadership—Mr. Blundell's New Kenya Party. Full dominion status for the Central African Federation as a result of the withdrawal of the powers now exercised by the British Government seems an impossibility.

As the example and influence from Ghana, Nigeria, the Congo and Tanganyika grow, so will the strain upon the Federation increase. We must therefore envisage the possibility of a collapse of the Federation. In that event the Zambesi will become a political dividing line of the greatest meaning to the white population of Southern Rhodesia and the Union. The collapse of the Federation would be a moment of truth for the white population.

It is imperative that we remind ourselves once again that the forces and influences that have arisen in West Africa, the Congo and East Africa are not co-ordinated. They have no single leadership. To think of the arrival upon the Zambesi of political forces that are massive and resolute is to misunderstand entirely the confused and shifting and immature character of much that is taking place. The issue of White and Black may still be dwarfed by the unresolved issues within and between the new African states. These proper warnings, however, do not alter the fact that in a fundamental sense the strategic and political position of the White population of the south has undergone a most drastic change.

The collapse of the Central African Federation or an obviously insoluble stalemate between Black and White could and probably would bring about a more intimate association between Southern Rhodesia and the Union. There are too many issues like republicanism and disagreements upon cultural policies that make it unwise to discuss the form which this association might take. Were I in Dr. Verwoerd's seat, which both my friends and enemies tell me is unlikely, I would be fascinated by the possibilities for the Union of a collapse of the Federation. The positive movement of Southern Rhodesia into the orbit of the Union would, at least in the short term, affirm the policy of White supremacy. To bring this to pass would be worth concessions in such divisive and provocative matters as republicanism and some of the harsher aspects of racialism.

There remains some questions which must be raised, although any answers must be considered as completely speculative. Is the white population of Southern Rhodesia and the Union in

danger? What is the nature of the danger? What could be done about it?

We have recognised that Africa has passed the point of no return. The concessions and promises already made have committed most of Africa south of the Sahara to self-rule. Dr. Nkrumah's pan-African dream indicates his conviction that the resolution of the struggle between white and black is only a matter of time. It is easy and correct to point out that he and those like him over-estimate black power and under-estimate white power. But he is shrewdly correct in insisting that the future of Africa depends upon the degree of its balkanisation or of its integration. The growth of pan-African sentiment and the manner of its expression and organisation could be of enormous consequence to the Union. The growth of sentiment against the present policies in the Union seems inevitable. But can it be in any way effectively mobilised?

Dr. Nkrumah is not a Bismarck and does not have the opportunities of a Bismarck. Other leaders are on the way up who may not share his vision or approve of his methods. For a while we may be listening in Africa to a parrot's cage of altercation between leaders and programs. It may be worth while to look elsewhere for some guide lines. The South and Central American republics which arose out of the collapse of the Spanish and Portuguese Empires required all of the Nineteenth Century and some of the Twentieth Century to resolve their problems of domestic government and inter-state relations. The process is even yet not complete. What we sometimes call the Arab world is roughly a generation ahead of Africa. Its nationalism and anti-colonialism are ardent forces. In North Africa it has France and the Algerian colons as powerful reason to stand together. Israel is ringed about by a sullen and implacable Arab hostility. Yet Tunis has broken with Egypt. Morocco has not made common cause with Algerian insurgence. Nasser has some of his bitterest enemies amongst Arab rivals.

There is no sound reason to suppose that conditions in the Africa of the coming generation will be greatly different. There will be a struggle—it has already begun—between the forces of integration and separatism. The new nationalism and old tribalism will have difficulty in coming to terms. An effort will be made to unscramble the scramble for Africa. The rectification of arbitrary frontiers, and the rejoining of sundered tribes represent a special African irredentism of which almost every territory has

a potential example. Political and economic inexperience contain the seed of confusion and discord. It is the unusual state that has the economic development to match its political pretensions. Understaffing of government and the lack of industrial and fiscal skill will take a generation to rectify. A cadre of competent officials can develop only slowly. Mussolini and Stalin were in a position to move about twenty years after their revolutions. It took that amount of time to train and staff their departments.

These comments are neither cynical about the new African states nor a bland reassurance to those who are affected by them. The white societies of the south are compelled to study the rest of Africa with anxious concern. The time for complacency is gone. Even though the Arab world cannot prevail against the resoluteness of Israel, its hostility has costly consequences for Israel. The Jews of Israel are condemned to a level of military preparedness that drastically limits the economic development of the country. Worse yet, Israel has no access to its obvious markets. An unnatural internal economy and a hazardous relationship with world markets are handicaps to the major goals of Israel. Nor can Israel use the labor resources of the Arab world in the development of her economy. She must pay at very high rates for the labor available to her. These analogies probably go beyond mere illustration. They have a practical bearing on the sort of Africa in which the Union will have its being in the next generation. South Africa is the Israel of Africa. A high level of police and defense costs, a more inflexible flow of labor, unfavorable markets for South African goods—these are educated guesses that may not go nearly far enough in measuring the adverse effects of the coming developments in Africa.

World opinion limits South Africa's opportunities to take whatever strong steps may be necessary to strengthen her position and widen the margin of safety. Now I wish to be very bold, perhaps even rash. I want to dabble in some *Realpolitik*. What are the conditions, however theoretical, that would correct the weakening strategic position of the Union? These conditions are not recommendations on my part and they contain no wishes about the outcome of the history of the next generation. *Realpolitik*, according to Webster's dictionary, is "cynically, reliance upon armed strength for gaining one's ends in national or international affairs." In a confrontation with Black Africa the policy of *apartheid* must rule out any important use of the domestic African or Indian population. The logical consequence of making minimal

use of African and Indian manpower should be an intensive policy of increasing the White population. I would have more respect for the gospel of *apartheid* if its sponsors had the insight, however cynical, to recognise that a most vigorous immigration policy was a logical outcome. But the price that must be paid for racial and cultural particularism is an inability to open wide the Union's doors to the Italians, Greeks, Germans, English and others who have strengthened the national manpower of Canada and Australia. In the atmosphere of *Realpolitik*, the elimination of enclaves and the rationalisation of frontiers would be considered inevitable. The virtual annexation of South-West Africa may have been bad international relations or dubious international law. But it was sound *Realpolitik*. So would be the annexation of Bechuanaland, Basutoland or Swaziland. So (note the exclamation mark) would be the annexation of all Portuguese territory that immediately flanks South African frontiers! So would be a back-to-the-wall alliance with the White population of Southern Rhodesia. Let me not deceive you. This *Realpolitik* is anachronistic, and completely academic. My only purpose in trifling with these ideas is to bring us all back to today's world. In that world South Africa is isolated and in danger. Destiny is marching to its borders. It will cross them in ways unseen and unpreventable. When it crosses them it will ask for a reckoning that I cannot foretell.

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# The Hoernlé Memorial Lectures

The IRR is republishing the text of the Hoernlé Memorial Lectures, a series of talks which started in 1945. The original introductory note to the lecture series reads as follows:

*A lecture, entitled the Hoernlé Memorial Lecture (in memory of the late Professor R. F. Alfred Hoernle), President of the Institute from 1934—1943), will be delivered once a year under the auspices of the South African Institute of Race Relations. An invitation to deliver the lecture will be extended each year to some person having special knowledge and experience of racial problems in Africa or elsewhere.*

*It is hoped that the Hoernlé Memorial Lecture will provide a platform for constructive and helpful contributions to thought and action. While the lecturers will be entirely free to express their own views, which may not be those of the Institute as expressed in its formal decisions, it is hoped that lecturers will be guided by the Institute's declaration of policy that "scientific study and research must be allied with the fullest recognition of the human reactions to changing racial situations; that respectful regard must be paid to the traditions and usages of the various national, racial and tribal groups which comprise the population; and that due account must be taken of opposing views earnestly held."*

## About the IRR

Since 1929, the Institute of Race Relations has advocated for a free, fair, and prospering South Africa. At the heart of this vision lie the fundamental principles of liberty of the individual and equality before the law guaranteeing the freedom of all citizens. The IRR stands for the right of all people to make decisions about their lives without undue political or bureaucratic interference.